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GROSS V. SWITZERLAND AND RIGHT TO DIE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
STEPHEN BROWN 
 
 Among international human rights courts, the European Court of Human Rights is 
unusual.1 Where most human rights bodies’ findings may only recommend, the judgments of the 
ECtHR are binding on state parties under the European Convention on Human Rights.2 At the 
same time, the ECHR is unusual among human rights treaties in that it conditions many of the 
rights it guarantees, allowing governments to interfere with those rights when done for public 
policy reasons.3 The framework of the ECHR has led to the development of a body of 
jurisprudence designed to both maintain the status quo and expand the fundamental rights 
enumerated in the Convention.4 When examined in this context, Gross v. Switzerland, and the 
Court’s preceding case law regarding assisted suicide, show that the court is inexorably moving 
towards acceptance of a universal right to die. While this right will not manifest itself until 
individual state legislatures have established a domestically-recognized right to die, the Court 
has indicated that it will create no impediments when that time comes. Through an examination 
of the ECtHR’s assisted suicide jurisprudence, the trend becomes particularly clear. 
While the Court has recognized and supported the concept of a right to die a dignified, 
certain, and painless death, much of the European Human Rights jurisprudence still relies on the 
practice of convention states. Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court leaves legal 
determinations of cultural and ethical significance to individual state parties.5 The Court has 
recognized that it is further from and less responsive to the needs of the citizens.6 Therefore, the 
ECtHR generally permits violations of the Convention in cases where the right or obligation is 
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not well established.7 Generally, states are granted a greater margin of appreciation when 
culturally significant issues are at stake and state practice is sporadic.8  Only when the European 
community has come to a consensus on an ethical principle will the Court step in and require that 
a state amend its laws to conform to the terms of the ECHR.9 
 That being said, European states are moving towards recognition of a right to assisted 
suicide. Beginning in 2002, the Netherlands decriminalized voluntary end-of-life euthanasia.10 
Soon thereafter, Belgium and Luxembourg followed suit, granting access to euthanasia through 
various statutory schema.11 In February 2014, Belgium took an unprecedented step removing 
majority age limitations on voluntary euthanasia.12 France is poised to legalize euthanasia within 
the year as well.13 While the ECtHR is unlikely to require states to provide access to lethal 
substances for suicide, it has made it clear that other human rights considerations will not bar 
states from doing so on whatever terms they choose.  Even so, the Court has come a long way in 
its recognition of the right to die. 
 In 2002, the Court’s initial exploration of a right to die was short lived. In Sanlés Sanlés 
v. Spain, a quadriplegic man sought to obtain a lethal dose of some substance that would 
painlessly end his life.14 As assisted suicide is illegal in Spain, the man sought a judgment from 
the Spanish court authorizing a physician to issue such a prescription without legal 
consequences.15 The court refused, and the man appealed to the ECtHR. However, by the time 
his case was heard, he had committed suicide by other means.16 The Court found that the 
complaint, championed by the quadriplegic’s sister-in-law, was inadmissible for lack of 
standing.17 
 In that same year, the ECtHR again took a restrictive stance towards recognition of a 
Convention right to assisted suicide. In Pretty v. United Kingdom, the applicant was dying of an 
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incurable, degenerative disease.18 Her disease had progressed to such a point that she was in 
enormous pain and was physically unable to take her own life, even though she desired to do 
so.19 Her husband was willing to assist her, but was concerned with the repercussions.   In the 
United Kingdom, suicide is not illegal, but assisting someone else in committing suicide is.20 
Pretty contacted the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) and asked that her husband not be 
prosecuted for assisting her in ending her life.21 The DPP refused her request and the domestic 
appeals courts likewise denied her relief.22 
 She then sought relief from the ECtHR on the basis that the DPP’s denial violated her 
right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR,23 freedom from inhumane treatment in Article 3,24 and 
right to respect for private life in Article 8.25 As to the first claim, the Court found that the right 
to life in Article 2, on its face, could not possibly be interpreted to provide a negative, 
complementary right to die.26 However, the ECtHR noted that if a state were to read Article 2 as 
encompassing a right to die, that reading would not violate the Convention.27 Regarding Article 
3, the Court likewise ruled that the DPP’s refusal to grant Pretty’s request would be an 
unprecedented extension of the word “treatment.”28 Finally, the Court found that a right to 
determine the means and timing of death could be read into a right to respect for private life.29 It 
nevertheless ruled that there was no violation because infringement of Article 8 would not occur 
if it was “in accordance with the law” and “necessary for democratic society.”30 The Court in 
Pretty unanimously found that the DPP did not violate the ECHR.31 
 Almost a decade later, the ECtHR once again found that states were not obligated to 
recognize a right to die under the Convention. In Haas v. Switzerland, the Court examined a 
situation distinct from prior cases in a variety of ways. First, Mr. Haas was not physically ill or 
disabled, but suffered from a mental illness, bipolar disorder.32 Second, Switzerland had passed 
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laws legalizing assisted suicide under medical supervision.33 Haas had attempted and failed to 
end his life twice before he tried to legally obtain a prescription of sodium pentobarbital—a 
substance used for euthanasia—but his requests were refused.34 Haas then sought a judgment 
awarding him access to sodium pentobarbital from the Swiss judiciary, but the domestic court 
denied him relief on the grounds that the right to die with dignity was necessarily conditioned by 
concerns for public health and safety.35 The Swiss court refused to circumvent the legislature’s 
policy considerations by assisting Haas in suicide without a prescription.36  Consequently, Haas 
sent letters to 170 psychiatrists requesting a prescription for sodium pentobarbital and was 
rejected by every last one of them on various grounds.37 
 Left without other relief, Haas went before the Court of Human Rights. There he argued 
that the Swiss government denying him his right to self-determination under Article 8.38 Haas 
proposed that Article 8 created a positive obligation of states to facilitate suicide where the 
citizen wished to exercise the right to die.39 The Court responded by first acknowledging that 
under current assisted suicide case law, the right to choose when and how to die was protected 
under Article 8 of the Convention.40 It then stated that, like any other right, the right to die was 
vulnerable to interference if that interference were necessary for a democratic society. Given that 
there was no European consensus on the right to die, the Court found that states enjoyed a wide 
margin of appreciation on the issue.41 Therefore, it found that the Swiss assisted suicide law did 
not violate the Convention. 
 At the same time, the Court also developed its jurisprudence surrounding the right to life 
contained in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 2 on its face imposes a blanket obligation for 
states to investigate unusual deaths within their jurisdiction.42 As case law has developed, the 
right to life obligations have expanded, requiring states to affirmatively step in and prevent 
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suicide.43 For example, in Renolde v. France, the Court found that states owed incarcerated 
individuals a duty to protect them from self-harm if it were foreseeable.44 While the right to die 
has become more defined, the ECtHR has clearly expanded the state protections guaranteed 
under Article 2. 
Finally, in Gross v. Switzerland, applicant Alda Gross wished to end her life using 
sodium pentobarbital. Unlike previous cases heard by the ECtHR on euthanasia or assisted 
suicide, Gross did not suffer from any terminal illness nor did she suffer from a debilitating or 
painful condition that would dramatically reduce her quality of life. Gross was simply getting 
older, and she did not want to remain alive to witness her own inevitable physical and mental 
decline.45 For years Gross had expressed a wish to end her life and in 2005 attempted to commit 
suicide.46 Subsequently, in connection with inpatient treatment, Gross underwent a psychiatric 
examination, in which her psychiatric doctor found that she was capable of forming her own, 
well-reasoned judgment on the matter. 47 
Gross sent letters to several medical practitioners requesting a prescription for sodium 
pentobarbital.48 The doctors refused her , one replying that the Swiss medical code of 
professional conduct prohibited her request and another one expressing concerns about being 
drawn into potential legal proceedings.49 Thereafter, Gross sought a judgment from the Swiss 
Supreme Court establishing that providing a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital to a person who 
was not suffering from any illness—but who expressed a reasonable desire to die—would not be 
a violation of a medical practitioner’s professional duties. 50 
The Swiss Supreme Court denied Gross’s application, stating that Switzerland had no 
positive obligation to assist its citizens in a painless and certain death.51 It further held that 
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existing procedures served the public interest by preventing hasty decisions and keeping access 
to lethal substances restricted.52 
Having obtained no relief from domestic courts, Gross brought her complaint to the 
ECtHR. She submitted that the Swiss court’s denial of her petition constituted a violation of 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Gross argued that her right to die was illusory if it was dependent on a 
doctor following the Swiss medical professional code, which prohibited assistance in committing 
suicide in situations other than end of life care.53 She further contended that the domestic court’s 
decisions giving authority to physicians was contradictory to the ECtHR’s case law which stated 
that Article 8 rights extended to any person who was mentally capable of making the decision to 
die.54 
 The Swiss law regarding assisted suicide is determined based on the intent of the 
assistant.55 The Swiss Criminal Code differentiates between assisting someone to commit suicide 
for selfish reasons and doing so selflessly. It is this differentiation which allows doctors to 
prescribe lethal doses for euthanasia. However, as the ECtHR noted, the Swiss code did not 
establish any guidelines with the force of law for when euthanasia was permissible.56 The 
medical professional code, which does not have the formal force of law, states that euthanasia is 
an option when a patient reaches the final stages of life and in certain other limited situations.57 
The code specified that euthanizing a patient on request, even if the patient is serious and 
insistent, is a criminal offense under the Article 114 of the Criminal Code. 58 
 Without addressing the Convention’s application to Gross’s situation, the Court held that 
the uncertainty created by the lack of clear regulatory boundaries would create additional 
anguish for people in Gross’ position.59 The maze of legislative and non-legislative materials 
would likewise have a chilling effect on doctors seeking to assist in suicide legally.60 Therefore, 
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the Court found that the amalgam of regulations was impermissibly vague.61 While Swiss law 
established that there was some possibility of obtaining a sodium pentobarbital, it provided 
insufficient guidelines as to when that right was applicable.62 While the ECHR does permit the 
rights in Article 8 to be limited, provided there is a legitimate justification, it requires that any 
limitation be foreseeable and clearly applicable.63 The Court left it up to domestic authorities to 
formulate more comprehensive and clear guidelines without taking any stance on what the 
substance of those guidelines ought to be.64 
 Dissenting, a panel of three judges found that the Swiss legal code was sufficiently clear. 
It noted that the Swiss Supreme Court had decided that assisted suicide was only appropriate 
when done under the supervision of a doctor.65 By creating no exception for sodium 
pentobarbital in the Therapeutic Products Act, the Swiss authorities left such determinations to 
qualified medical professionals.66 More in line with the Court’s unanimous decision in Haas, the 
dissenting judges found that the Swiss Federal jurisprudence established clear guidelines for 
anyone seeking assisted suicide.67 
 The dissent’s argument further pointed out that Gross was essentially the same case as 
Haas.68 Where in both cases the applicant was unable to obtain assistance in suicide, Haas had a 
serious psychological disorder that significantly reduced his quality of life and Gross was merely 
getting old.69 Considering that the same laws governed in Haas and Gross, there is no reason that 
the court should find Swiss legal code suddenly so vague as to constitute a violation the ECHR. 
 Furthermore, the dissent argued that it could make a substantive determination on the 
merits of the case. In a margin of appreciation analysis, the dissent found that there was no 
consensus regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia.70 Switzerland was one of only four states 
that allowed any form of euthanasia or assisted suicide.71 Given that Switzerland had a liberal 
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tolerance for assisted suicide within its borders, it should be given a considerable margin of 
appreciation.72 Therefore, the dissent found that the Swiss legal code was sufficiently clear and 
did not violate Article 8 of the ECHR.73 
 Thus, the implicit message that the strict majority sent in Gross is that the ECtHR has 
changed gears regarding assisted suicide. Where in previous case law, the court had denied that 
there was any positive state obligation to assist their nationals to commit suicide, by refusing to 
affirm its own judgment in Haas, the Court implied that assisted suicide regulation should be 
broadened.74 While in previous cases the ECtHR had stated that respect for human dignity and 
human freedom were the very essence of the convention,75 it had gone further in recognizing a 
right to prevent suicide than to facilitate it.76 As the dissenting opinion showed, the court could 
have found the Swiss legal code sufficiently clear to rule on it substantively. In all likelihood, it 
would not have required the Swiss government to recognize a right to die for healthy people, as 
that strays too far from the normative leniency of the margin of appreciation. In light of previous 
case law, the holding does suggest that Switzerland may expand the right to die while not 
recognizing it outright. 
 On the present jurisprudential trajectory, only one question remains: what happens when 
the right to die a dignified death under Article 8 comes into conflict with the right to life 
provided in Article 2? Provided that states’ acceptance continues to grow and people are granted 
increasing access to lethal substances, someone will eventually abuse the mechanisms giving 
substance to the right to die. Just recently, an English man’s wife and son were accused of trying 
to induce him to commit assisted suicide in Switzerland.77 Should such an issue come before the 
ECtHR, the court will be required to prioritize one convention right over the other. However, the 
ECHR has always included rights fundamentally in tension with one another,78 and as the 
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ECtHR’s assisted suicide prudence shows, the Court does its best to recognize both sides. When 
the time comes for the Court to make a determination, it will likely intervene as little as possible 
to leave both rights intact. 
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